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Prior studies have demonstrated the importance of bridging structural holes across functional groups in IS projects.  
In this study, we argue that bridging structural holes is necessary but insufficient for ensuring project success.  An 
additional requirement is that knowledge holes across functional groups need to be bridged to enable effective 
problem-solving across functional groups.  We propose and empirically study the concept of knowledge holes in a 
case study of an ERP upgrade.  Our findings suggest that complementary to the concept of structural holes, the 
concept of knowledge holes is useful for explaining different project outcomes.  Our findings also demonstrate 
methods for bridging knowledge holes.  Contributions of this study are manifold. 
Keywords 
Knowledge holes, structural holes, boundary spanner, IS projects. 
INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of knowledge communities and the need for their integration result in the emergence of flexible 
organizational forms, such as cross-functional projects (e.g., ERP implementations).  During cross-functional 
projects, people representing different communities coordinate to achieve organizational goals.  However, there is 
no guarantee that by assigning people to projects, knowledge will be transmitted/created for achieving goals.   
This paper introduces the idea of knowledge holes.  The literature has documented the important role of boundary 
spanners who use weak ties to bridge structural holes across organizations’ functional boundaries (Hargadon and 
Sutton, 1997).  The boundary spanner literature has generally focused on their relationship structures and how they 
help bridge structural holes.  We show that boundary spanners must also bridge knowledge holes (Pawlowski and 
Robey, 2004).  Each function contains within it specialized knowledge.  When boundary spanners perform their 
role, some knowledge is transmitted across the boundary.  We show such knowledge does not translate successfully 
unless boundary spanners understand the knowledge within the transmitting boundary.  Thus, boundary spanners 
must span not only the structural hole, but the knowledge hole. 
We demonstrate our claim through a cross-case analysis of two departments participating in an ERP upgrade project.  
In one case, boundary spanners between IT and the function understood knowledge across the functional boundary, 
including syntax/meanings/consequences.  Thus, solutions were localized around problems faced in the department, 
and jointly implemented.  In the other, this knowledge was poorly understood resulting in incomplete solutions and 
unresolved problems.  Our contribution is a more nuanced theorization for analyzing events and actions within and 
across IS project boundaries.  Our findings further suggest a shift of focus from boundary spanners’ appropriating 
boundary objects for bridging knowledge holes (Carlile, 2002, 2004) to their practices and interaction for creating 
common narratives about those events and actions.  
KNOWLEDGE SPACES OF AN IT PROJECT 
Cross-functional IT projects involve designing/implementing IT artifacts where at least two organizational 
departments are involved (Simon and Newell, 1971).  In most such projects, one cross-boundary problem occurs 
where the project team (i.e., internal IT members and/or consultants) must understand the non-IT problem (i.e., the 
problem space) and construct IT solutions to the problem (i.e., the design space) (Purao, Rossi and Bush, 2002).   
The problem space is a metaphorical space containing the team’s interpretation of user requirements in the face of a 
task environment (Purao et al., 2002).  It includes a mental model of “a subset of the real world with which a 
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computer system is concerned” (Guindon, 1990: 317).  To construct the problem space, there must be an 
understanding of the task/requirements, and a conceptual match between information about the task/requirements 
and IT technologies’ capacities/advantages/limitations/impact (Bassellier, Reich and Benbasat, 2001).  Conceptual 
mismatch can cause major difficulty in constructing the problem space.   
The design space, also known as the implementation domain (Blum, 1989), is a metaphorical space that contains 
mental representations of the team’s solutions to the problem, based on which the team creates formal 
models/specifications for building systems (Purao et al., 2002).  The team can explore diverse solutions based on 
current IS methods/techniques (Oxman, 1997).  For example, information systems can be developed in-house, 
outsourced, or customized from application packages.  Or an IT project can follow open source or agile 
development.  Different solutions can generate distinct consequences.  The project team and departments involved 
share the consequences of a solution (Carlile, 2002, 2004).   
The knowledge domains in the problem and design space are often different (Iivari, Hirschheim and Klein, 2004).  
The knowledge domain of the problem space (i.e., application domain knowledge) is often associated with the 
departments/functions.  For example, in an accounting-based IT project, lots of the necessary problem-space 
knowledge will be associated with accounting.  The literature has emphasized the importance of application domain 
knowledge for solving problems in the real world.  High application domain knowledge is found to prompt IT teams 
to engage in strategies contingent upon the nature of a problem: a focused search for solving simple problems, and 
an exploratory search for complex, ill-defined problems; in contrast, teams with low application domain knowledge 
tend to be distracted by simple problems’ surface features (e.g., the order of prompts in a problem description), and 
cannot meaningfully code information for solving complex problems  (Khatri and Vessey, 2016).   
In contrast, the knowledge domain of the design space is often technical/IT related (i.e., IS domain knowledge).  
Algorithms, hardware configurations, programming languages, design languages and databases are often associated 
with the design space.  Technical complexity can be a barrier for departments to understand IT’s 
language/meanings, and to envision consequences associated with solutions.  The literature has documented the way 
IT projects and their impacts is communicated to departments is consequential (Lapointe and Rivard, 2005).  
Further, departments’ knowledge for designing workarounds and understanding of costs/benefits/risks associated 
with operating an IS can impact their choices about how to engage with the system, leading to organization-wide 
consequences (e.g., errors/inefficiencies/shadow systems) (Alter, 2014).  Given the two kinds of knowledge are 
possessed by different departments, it is often necessary to have individuals perform boundary spanning to bridge 
departments. 
BOUNDARY SPANNING 
Boundary spanning refers to activities, occurring at functional boundaries (Pawlowski and Robey, 2004).  It is about 
creating/maintaining linkages to “monitor, exchange with, or represent” (Mange and Eisenberg, 1987: 313) a group 
to its environment.  Boundary-spanning can be responses to the environment, or proactive moves for managing 
interdependencies (Cross, Yan and Louis, 2000).   
It involves a two-step process: searching out relevant information on one side, and disseminating it on the other 
(Tushman and Scanlan, 1981).  Each department only knows things under its purview, so departments need 
information from others to adapt/coordinate goals and activities to meet organizational/environmental demands.  
However, searching without disseminating creates internal silos (Roberts and O'Reilly, 1979).  Thus, successful 
boundary spanning must also fulfill the external representation function to important outsiders, such as 
customers/suppliers/the board of directors for obtaining their support/resources (Ancona and Caldwell, 1988).  
Boundary spanning can only be accomplished by those who are well connected externally/internally.  Specific 
boundary spanning activities include environmental scanning, contractual negotiation, task coordination (Choi, 
2002), building relationships (Druskat and Wheeler, 2003), representing projects to stakeholders (Marrone, 2010), 
and routinizing information searching/acquiring/storing activities (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997).  
The boundary spanning literature principally employs network structure as a proxy for information flow and 
assumes connections lead to information processing across boundaries (Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Hargadon and 
Sutton, 1997; Podolny and Baron, 1997; Xiao and Tsui, 2007).  How the substance of the network structure is 
moved/combined/transformed across structural holes is rarely studied.  An exception is the work of Pawlowski and 
Robey (2004) who argue that boundary spanners need to reframe/translate information from one group in terms of 
the perspective of another, deliberately ask why to challenge current processes, and build cases to generate support 
for their proposals. 
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Structural hole theory highlights the information and control benefits boundary spanners can create in an ill-
connected network (Burt, 1992, 2005).  Boundary spanners are often the main channel to access knowledge and to 
negotiate solutions across boundaries.  Their network position exposes them to information that reveals 
conditions/opportunities otherwise invisible to those within boundaries.  That information can possibly inform 
strategies to negotiate solutions.  A structural view of boundary spanning thus must be augmented by considering 
the knowledge understood by boundary spanners in the network.  Other research finds while knowledge diversity is 
correlated with network structure, there is considerable variance unexplainable by network structure (Rodan and 
Galunic, 2004).  We therefore argue just having individuals perform boundary spanning is insufficient to bridge the 
problem space/design space gap.  We introduce the concept of knowledge holes, arguing that knowledge holes 
should be spanned so that knowledge can be applied on both sides of the hole to solve shared problems.  Knowledge 
holes refer to the absence of shared syntaxes/interpretations/consequences that impedes problem-solving across 
boundaries.  They can be considered as a complement to “structural holes” which are missing relations that inhibit 
information flow between people (Burt, 1992).   
Based on Carlile (2002; 2004), we argue knowledge across boundaries comprises three elements: shared 
syntax/interpretations/consequences.  First, a shared syntax is a medium for representing/storing/retrieving 
knowledge with fixed meaning (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Vilhena et al., 2014).  It is vocabulary specific to 
situations (Khatri, Vessey, Ramesh, Clay and Park, 2006).  For example, the ER model’s symbols (e.g., 
rectangles/diamonds) are the syntax to represent objects, abstract concepts and their relationships in a system.  
While shared syntax is always necessary to analyze problems, it is insufficient to represent semantic differences and 
dependencies, particularly when novel conditions emerge (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Carlile, 2002).  Even under 
stable conditions, the same concept can have different connotations for different people.  For example, the concept 
of production cost means different things for the accounting and manufacturing departments.  For accounting, 
production cost involves calculating the accurate actual cost with consideration of equipment/machinery 
depreciation.  For manufacturing, production cost emphasizes the variance analysis between predefined and actual 
cost for monitoring/intervention.   
Second, shared interpretation means there is consensus of meaning (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Carlile, 2002).  
Shared interpretation is situated in the context and contains a group’s systems of meaning and cognitive repertoires, 
i.e., what they know and how they know it.  It cannot be easily transferred across boundaries, and requires 
translation into another group’s perspective (Carlile, 2004).  Shared interpretation can only be reached by 
understanding the nuances/details of actual practice (Brown and Duguid, 1991), learning from different interpretive 
communities (Fish, 1980), or enhancing mental models by using cognitive support tools (Vitharana, Zahedi and Jain, 
2016).  Shared interpretation recognizes even if shared syntax exists, interpretations can be different and evolve over 
time/space (Carlile, 2002).  For example, through interacting with users, a team discovers “data availability” not 
only means data available “at users’ request” but “the liberty” to retrieve/update data when needed.   
Third, shared consequences recognizes the purposive nature of knowledge as people create/apply knowledge to 
solve problems (Carlile, 2002).  Shared consequences involve developing common interests and making trade-offs 
between actors (Brown and Duguid, 1991).  Common interests motivate joint problem-solving, whereas when 
interests are in conflict (i.e., solving a problem does good for one, but does harm for the other), one of the parties 
may be unwilling to make changes; likewise, projected positive consequences of a solution motivate people to adopt 
the solution, whereas negative ones imply the need to alter the solution or create a new one, and validate it (Carlile, 
2002, 2004).  Thus, shared consequences can be achieved by identifying actors involved, convincing them they have 
common problems, and persuading them to accept responsibilities and outcomes associated with the solution (e.g., 
learning or transforming skills/knowledge) (Callon, 1986).   
Constructing the problem space/design space requires shared syntax/interpretations/consequences, so that common 
issues and potential solutions can be identified/debated/understood.  Problems not represented, translated and 
resolved can prove consequential over time.  For example, many ERP workarounds are performed because the 
problem being worked around is not represented in the system.  Likewise, solutions not understood, negotiated and 
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valued will not receive attention and support needed to implement them.  For example, users who are not well 
trained may ignore an ERP system’s querying facilities in favor of doing their own analysis in MS Excel. 
As we move from shared syntax, to shared interpretations, and to shared consequences, complexity increases.  
Shared consequences require the existence of shared syntaxes and interpretations (Carlile, 2004).  However, it is also 
likely that given shared syntaxes and interpretations, actors are unwilling to make trade-offs and negotiate 
solutions/responsibilities, because transforming or learning new skills can be costly.   
Table 1 presents our preliminary conception of the intersection between the problem/design space and knowledge 
holes (Liu, Chua and Wang, 2016).  A hypothetical knowledge failure in any of the quadrants could lead to 
difficulties implementing IT projects. 
 Problem Space Design Space 
Syntactical 
hole 
Definition: IT’s failure to comprehend 
terms/labels that describe the problem a 
department faces in their task environment. 
Example: IT is not clear about what the 
consolidated financial statement is composed 
of, such as which companies are subsidiaries or 
associates, which accounting items are 
included, which currencies are used etc. 
Definition: departments’ failure to comprehend 
terms/labels that describe IT solutions.  
Example: Accounting thinks of data storage as a 
group of Excel spreadsheets and does not 
appreciate the additional complexity of querying 
a database.  They thus neglect to specify 
important data cubes they need 
Interpretation 
hole 
Definition: IT’s failure to adjust their 
interpretation of the problem a department 
faces in related contexts.  
Example: IT fails to understand that “price” is 
negotiated between buyer and seller and 
assumes everything has a fixed price under all 
conditions. 
Definition: departments’ failure to evaluate 
potential IT solutions and their implications.  
Example: Purchasing is not aware that input is 
required from them for IT to develop solutions 
to effectively integrate with suppliers. 
Consequence 
hole 
Definition: IT’s failure to envision how a 
problem influences the departments involved 
and agree on the scope of the problem. 
Example: IT understands a requirement, but 
thinks of the requirement as of low priority to 
be delayed to the next implementation cycle.  
They don’t understand not implementing this 
violates accounting principles. 
Definition: departments’ failure to envision how 
the adopted IT solution impacts the departments 
and accept ensuing responsibilities and 
outcomes. 
Example: Marketing thinks of an IT 
implementation as a new physical device used 
by data-entry people.  They don’t understand 
the new system will impact those who aren’t 
using the system (e.g., by impacting 
commission calculations). 
Table 1. Syntactical/interpretation/consequence holes in the problem/design space 
METHODOLOGY  
We conducted a cross-case analysis of a 10-month long ERP upgrade project in two functions of a Taiwanese 
manufacturer (ElectroCom) (Yin, 2003).  An upgrade is the replacement of an installed version with a new one from 
the software vendor (Khoo and Robey, 2007).  It varies in terms of scope (technical and/or functional upgrade) and 
version (minor or major) (Ng, 2001).  The project involved a major version and functional upgrade of a highly 
customized system.  Hence, bringing together diverse knowledge was needed to decide what the upgraded system 
would look like.  We compared how knowledge domains (i.e., application/IS domains) understood by representative 
users (i.e., boundary spanners) in the two functions affected the construction of the problem/design space, and 
ultimately the IT project outcome for the departments concerned. 
Research site 
ElectroCom is a Taiwanese manufacturer, with headquarters in Taiwan, factories in Taiwan and China, and sales 
offices across Pacific Asia/Europe/the US.  At the time of study, it employed over 2,500 employees worldwide.  
An ERP system had been used across ElectroCom in Taiwan and China since its first implementation in 1999.  The 
upgrade project was expected to affect offices and factories in Taiwan and China.  This project was in response to 
the local Taiwanese government’s adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) two years later 
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(i.e., in 2013).  It upgraded the database (from Oracle 9i to 11g) and ERP version (R11.5.10 to R12.1.3) from Oracle 
EBS.  The upgrade was scheduled for 10 months.  However, because of problems encountered, the upgrade for the 
marketing division was delayed by 3 months.  Three modules (finance, sales and distribution, and production) were 
upgraded across 4 divisions (SCM, marketing, general administration, and manufacturing).   
The upgrade project was the largest IT project in ElectroCom at the time, involving 6 internal IT members and 4 
consultants.  The internal IT members were highly skilled (an average company tenure about 10 years), with the 
most junior one having work experience with the Oracle ERP system for about 5 years.  The consultants were hired 
principally to facilitate training.  The ERP upgrade cost approximately 150 thousand US dollars, including an annual 
fee for the maintenance/support from Oracle, and the training fee paid to Taiwanese consultants.  The amount 
excludes new hardware, internal IT personnel costs, and the opportunity costs of users participating in the project. 
Data collection 
The first researcher accessed the site about 1 year after project completion to collect retrospective data.  We 
collected data from multiple sources (management/non-management/consultants) and used multiple methods.  Data 
collection methods include (1) interviews, (2) documentation, and (3) on-site observation (Table 2).  The 
documentation, especially, helped combat the retrospective nature of data collection as document contents do not 
change over time.   
Documents 
Project proposal 
Minutes of meetings including the kickoff and review meetings 
Project schedule 
Project-related training materials 
On-site observation 
Interviews 
Stakeholders # of interviews # of distinct interviewees 
Top management (including CIO) 4 2 
SCM representatives 3 2 
Marketing representatives 2 2 
IT 7 5 
Consultants (project manager) 1 1 
Total  17 12 
Table 2. Breakdown of data sources 
We first queried two knowledgeable IT members (IT project manager-CIO and project coordinator) about divisions 
affected by the implementation.  Two departments (marketing/supply chain management) had the strongest 
differences in outcomes.  Specifically, the implementation in the marketing department was described as “a total 
disaster” and “appalling” (IT project manager), whereas the supply chain management (SCM) department described 
the new ERP as “richer” and the project helped “connect more dots” (SCM user).  The first author thus focused data 
collection on those two departments to observe contrasting implementation processes.  As data collection proceeded, 
we serendipitously discovered representative users’ (i.e., boundary spanners) understanding of the IT domain 
knowledge affected the construction/implementation of IT solutions (i.e., bridged vs. unbridged knowledge holes).   
During data collection, the first author was assigned a meeting room in ElectroCom’s Taiwan premises to conduct 
interviews.  Interviews with two former employees and one consultant who were key project participants were 
conducted outside of the company premises.   
We developed an interview protocol and adapted it to reflect interviewees’ positions and issues as the research 
progressed.  Interview questions focused on issues related to project management (e.g., planning/execution/control 
and coordination/problem-solving/evaluation).  We asked interviewees (1) their roles in the organization/project, (2) 
tasks they involved, and (3) their experiences/perceptions in the project.   
Data analysis 
Within each case, we asked initial interviewees to identify potential boundary spanners who had more interaction 
across departments.  Representative users (i.e., key users) from both functions were nominated as boundary 
Liu et al.     Knowledge Holes in IS Project 
  
  6 
spanners.  They were required to acquire knowledge about user needs, relay knowledge to IT, and help implement 
IT solutions.  Based on preliminary definitions of knowledge holes in Table 1, we then focused on coding the three 
types of knowledge holes in the problem space/design space.  Table 3 has sample quotes.  New concepts were also 
allowed to emerge, and were categorized.  These new codes captured contextual factors associated with knowledge 
holes, causal mechanisms explaining bridged/unbridged holes, and project outcomes.  The analysis followed the 
constant comparison logic (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003).  
 
 Code definition & Quote  
Syntactical 
hole 
(problem space) Syntactical holes existed (1) if there were no common terms/labels to describe 
problems/concerns departments faced, or (2) if IT failed to understand terms/labels departments 
used to describe their problems/concerns; syntactical holes were bridged if IT shared and 
understood terms/labels that departments used to describe problems they faced. 
 
Many obsolete data [suppliers who they stopped trading with] were still around… They were 
becoming a burden to the system. (Consultant) [hole bridged because both IT and department 
described data of suppliers who they stopped trading with as the major problem] 
(design space) Syntactical holes existed (1) if there were no common terms/labels to describe IT 
solutions, or (2) if departments failed to understand terms/labels IT used to describe solutions; 
syntactical holes were bridged if departments shared and understood terms/labels IT used to 
describe IT solutions. 
 
IT told us the changed data structure a bit…we didn’t discuss much about the structure…[we’re] 
thinking that this would be just another minor upgrade… (Marketing key user) [holes not bridged 
because the department did not grasp the connotation of a changed data structure] 
Interpretation 
hole 
(problem space) Interpretation holes existed, if IT failed to adjust their interpretation of the 
problem a department faced in different settings; interpretation holes were bridged when IT had a 
mental extension or an awareness of contingencies that could change the interpretation of the 
problem. 
 
…each of [the users] dealt with distinct suppliers.  Some were in charge of purchasing raw 
materials, and some in charge of purchasing tools or equipment…They were exclusive contacts for 
distinct suppliers.  (IT, manufacturing module) [hole bridged because IT understood contingencies, 
i.e., data ownership, that might require alteration of IT solutions] 
(design space) Interpretation holes existed, if departments could not evaluate potential IT 
solutions and their implications according to their local situations; interpretation holes were 
bridged when departments had a mental extension or an awareness of contingencies that could 
possible change the meaning of potential IT solutions. 
 
Users complained about why IT couldn’t just migrate the data and save them efforts and time. I 
explained even if IT could do so, the changed data structure meant we had to check the data 
[manually]…(SCM key user) [hole bridged because the department could evaluate alternative IT 
solutions according to local situations and their implications] 
Consequence 
hole 
(problem space) consequence holes existed, if IT failed (1) to understand how a problem or 
project task influenced the department, or (2) to reach an agreement on the problem/task scope; 
consequence holes were bridged, when IT (1) understood the impact of a problem/project task to 
departments, and (2) reached an agreement on the problem/task scope.   
 
...We helped migrate data of clients and orders…[users] filled extra fields manually…it’s just 
garbage in, garbage out.  (IT, distribution module) [hole not bridged because IT was only willing 
to map out part of the problem scope and offered a partial solution] 
(design space) consequence holes existed, if departments failed (1) to understand how adopted 
solutions impacted the departments and (2) to accept ensuing responsibilities and outcomes; 
consequence holes were bridged, when departments (1) understood the impact of adopted IT 
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solutions, and (2) accepted ensuing responsibilities/outcomes. 
 
…To enter that amount of data…I kind of underestimated efforts required…also some sales orders 
were to be re-entered and checked…torrential workload in the last week…(Marketing key user) 
[hole not bridged because the department underestimated their responsibilities associated with 
adopted IT solutions] 
Table 3. Representative quotes grouped according to codes 
Due to space constraints, we present only one problem that provided us with rich insights (i.e., data management 
problem).  The problem in the SCM division is counterbalanced by a similar problem in the marketing division.  
This contrast demonstrates how knowledge holes were (not) bridged.  For each case, we highlight the knowledge 
holes in the problem/design space.   
FINDINGS 
When the project began, key users from all departments attended training sessions about the new ERP.  They were 
introduced to the ERP’s new features and the new financial regulations.  Initially, they thought the project was 
mainly to “help the finance people out” (Marketing key user) and knew “some effortful participation” (SCM key 
user) was required from them.  
The SCM and marketing key user had worked with IT on other projects before.  They were trusted by the 
department head and empowered to make decisions associated with the project.   
Master data quality 
Master data is a single source of common data shared across systems/applications/processes.  It describes attributes 
of business entities (e.g., products/sites/clients/suppliers), and is rarely changed.  Different business domains thus 
can use master data for their own functional needs.  Managing master data to enable the use of accurate, timely and 
relevant data across systems/applications is essential (Spruit and Pietzka, 2015).   
ElectroCom had accumulated a large amount of master data in the ERP over time, and protected it from 
unauthorized changes.  The common narrative was the master data constituted “the foundation” (SCM key user) and 
“a critical point of control” (SCM user) for many IT applications/systems.  However, the new ERP’s data structure 
was more complex.  It had more fields to fill, and was presented differently (HTML pages vs. a Windows-based 
form).  
Vignette: supplier master data 
Bridging knowledge holes in the problem space:  After the kick-off, IT informed the SCM key user about the task 
of managing the master data (e.g., cleansing/updating/enriching).  The key user then expressed her concern about 
users’ unwillingness to do the task, especially if users could not foresee its benefits.  After the discussion, the key 
user and IT agreed the major problem with the supplier master data lay in its obsolescence which could cause 
inefficiencies in daily routines and slow down the system.  “Obsolescence” became the buzzword used by the SCM 
and IT divisions to describe the problem.  
Many obsolete data [suppliers who they stopped trading with] were still around… They were becoming a burden to 
the system. (Consultant) 
The key user further probed to identify areas in supply chain the new data could possibly improve.  She discussed 
with IT/consultants during training and informally.  IT thus understood the key user anticipated the new data would 
be applied to enhance supply chain’s analytical capability.   
… [the SCM key user] asked consultants lots of questions…how those new data could possibly be useful…how to 
use those data to streamline their process…improve their analysis…we communicated a lot informally via phone or 
in person… (Project coordinator)  
Because of the conversations, the team realized the data-entry interface might compromise data quality, which 
would then reduce data analysis quality.  The key user identified specific problems, including the lack of user 
familiarity with the interface and the language barrier (i.e., Taiwanese users using an English interface).  IT thus 
could realistically imagine the specific difficulties users would face, and understood that users “needed some 
process to ensure its quality” (IT, manufacturing module). 
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The key user also elaborated how users coordinated daily tasks in the SCM division.  She made explicit her concern 
that specific users would be overwhelmed by additional data-entry tasks.  Also, she highlighted unless something 
was done, these data-entry users would be unable to obtain other SCM users’ support.  The key user thus lobbied IT 
to allow users to directly modify certain master data elements rather than seeking changes through the organizational 
bureaucracy. 
The key user explained to me that users deal with distinct suppliers…They are exclusive contacts for distinct 
suppliers.  (IT, manufacturing module) 
Bridging knowledge holes in the design space:  IT and users shared assumptions about the master data, including 
that it was “the foundation” (SCM key user) and “a critical point of control” (SCM user).  IT initially confined the 
master data task to the key user.  However, the key user formed a team to sell the project across the division and roll 
out training for managing master data to users.   
…explained to [3 relatively junior users] what I saw in this project…we four acted like a gang, demonstrating what 
to do to other users… (SCM key user) 
Only [the key user] and I attended the training session [for managing master data].  We then came up with our 
individual versions of SOP [standard operating procedures].  Each of us then taught another user one-on-one, 
asking the user to follow the SOP to input data of two suppliers…and wrote up their own SOPs…after this, these 
two users showed their SOPs to other two users and taught them…the teaching and learning snowballed from two to 
four, to six, to all users… (SCM user) 
Due to the training/guidance users received, they understood the data structure and access methods.  IT agreed to 
extend SCM users’ access to the master data.  Seven SCM users participated.  IT proposed two routes for solving the 
problem: (1) IT would migrate data to the new ERP, and users would update/correct data; or (2) users would 
compile data in Excel spreadsheets and then copy/paste the data to the new system.  The key user realized the first 
option would create more risk.   The key user and IT used the metaphor of house renovation vs. house building to 
explain the options to users.     
…I explained even if IT could do so [migrated data on users’ behalf], the changed data structure meant we had to 
check the data [manually].…it’s like building a new house vs. renovating one in very bad condition…we agreed with 
the “house building” solution. (SCM key user) 
The key user was mindful the increased workload could be a point of resistance with users.  She identified users 
with more critical jobs, and decreased their responsibilities. 
To achieve desired data quality, the key user helped develop procedures (e.g., feedback loops) and solicited 
management support to remove distractions. 
…spending one whole week…in a meeting room without disruption…users formed 2-person groups…both entered 
data of their suppliers, and had the other check the accuracy… (SCM key user) 
Consequently, SCM users accomplished the master data task on time and with high quality, and solved a “recurrent 
problem with converting PR [purchase requests] into PO [purchase orders]” (SCM user). 
Counter-vignette: Client master data 
Knowledge holes in the problem space: In the beginning of the project, IT informed the marketing key user about 
managing client master data.  IT warned the key user about the changed data structure and attendant risks (e.g., 
mismatched data).  Because the marketing key user perceived the system would provide minimal enhanced 
functionality to marketing, she considered the upgrade as “another minor upgrade” and the master data issue purely 
as a data-entry task for solving no specific problems.  She did not further probe why new data would be needed, how 
it could be useful, and how historical data could be better managed.   
Users didn’t see many improved system functionalities...didn’t fully grasp associated changes underneath… (IT, 
distribution module) 
Instead, because of the tremendous amount of client data, the marketing key user was more concerned if they could 
finish this task within an assigned deadline and in a consistent format.  The issue of data quality was considered a 
luxury hard to achieve.  In retrospect, the IT project manager described this as “a huge cognitive gap” between IT 
and marketing. 
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…new fields to be filled…in a consistent format…three persons would render three different formats…very limited 
time to verify data… (Marketing key user) 
The marketing key user was the only person from the division to make decisions.  To contain the project’s impact, 
she hoarded project information and assigned a junior administrative assistant to manage the data-entry task on her 
behalf.   
The marketing key user worked in her silo.  She did not consult those affected by the data-entry task.  She did not 
communicate expectations/concerns of the new system with others.  IT thus did not know activities users were 
involved in and underestimated the impact of the data-entry task on their routines.  
…We told them about this early, hoping they could coordinate their efforts…we didn’t find the efforts were seriously 
underestimated until very late…kind of too late to react at the end… (IT, distribution module)  
Knowledge holes in the design space: IT saw the project as “a reimplementation of a new ERP” (IT project 
coordinator) in which master data should be reviewed/maintained.  However, the marketing key user expected the 
upgrade to maintain status quo, and was satisfied “as long as data didn’t cause processes to stop.”  Therefore, 
training was not taken seriously, and knowledge not mapped to daily practices. 
IT would tell us to note down something…some terms I didn’t even understand at that time… (Marketing key user) 
In addition, the key user considered users as a threat to data consistency, and wanted to minimize their participation.  
IT thus suggested automatic migration of client master data to the new ERP, and one designated user to manage the 
data.  The key user sent the junior administrative assistant to enter and verify the data.  However, the assistant 
received limited training prior to starting the task.  She did not understand the importance of the master data, and 
had little knowledge about on-the-ground processes.  
…I mainly learnt the data structure on-the-job…Later, another admin assistant was assigned to join the task…she 
didn’t know much about information systems. (Marketing administrative assistant) 
The marketing key user adopted the IT solution as is without considering its impact on the assistant and the support 
the assistant needed.  Due to the lack of other users’ support/cooperation, the assistant could only perform the task 
perfunctorily.  IT described this situation as “garbage in, garbage out” (IT, distribution module) 
…we sent checklists to sales assistants to ask for their help to verify data…not many of them replied... (Marketing 
administrative assistant) 
Thus, the task was delayed and quality was below par.  The junior assistant and several sales assistants were forced 
to work during national holidays and experienced tremendous stress.  
Table 4 summarizes knowledge holes and boundary spanning activities associated with the data management 
problem. 
 




IT and key user 
described supplier data 
as obsolete 
Key user discussed with IT 
about operation anomalies (e.g., 
recurrent problems, slow 
systems) 
Key user probed future 
usage/benefits of new data 
Key user explained work 
procedures and discussed with 
IT contingency factors in their 
task environment (e.g., 
distributed data, non-
participants’ lack of support) 
Key user was walked through 
data-entry processes to visualize 
difficulties users would face 
Key user shared with IT the 
discourse about master data 
(e.g., a critical point of 
control) 
Key user shared with IT the 
metaphors to describe IT 
solutions (i.e., house building 
vs. renovation)  
Key user shared IT’s data 
quality concern given the 
system environment (i.e., 
interface and language) 
Interpretation 
hole (bridged) 
IT understood users’ 
expectation for better 
analytics in the future 
Key user understood 
potential IT solutions and 
attendant risks 
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IT understood users’ 
need for extensive data 
access 
(e.g., unfamiliar system 
environment, work overload, 
tedious task) 
Key user formed a team to sell 
the project and mobilize users 
Consequence 
hole (bridged) 
IT understood the 
impact of the data-entry 
task to users 
Key user was aware of the 
importance of training and 
guidance for users to assure 
data quality 
Marketing division  
Syntactical 
hole 
IT was concerned with 
data quality, but the key 
user was concerned with 
the deadline and format 
Key user did not probe to 
understand implications of the 
changed data structure (e.g., 
potentials, risks) 
Key user was overwhelmed 
and distracted by the amount of 
data 
Key user maintained the status 
quo 
Key user worked in her silo 
(e.g., barring users’ 
participation and feedback) 
Key user described the 
project as “another minor 
upgrade” (vs. “a 
reimplementation” by IT) 
Interpretation 
hole 
IT lacked knowledge 
about activities user 
were involved 
Key user accepted the 
proposed IT solution as is 
without questioning it or 
adding her perspective 
Consequence 
hole 
IT underestimated the 
impact of the data-entry 
task on users 
Key user ignored 
training/support/cooperation 
required for data-entry tasks 
Table 4. Knowledge holes and associated boundary spanning activities 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our study of an ERP upgrade project across two divisions in a large manufacturer reveals the importance of bridging 
knowledge holes for cross-functional IT projects.  Within the ERP upgrade project, key users and IT (i.e., IT 
representatives for individual modules) brought in diverse knowledge, and served the role as boundary spanners.  
Research on structural holes shows boundary spanners are exposed to alternative ways of thinking, and are 
important for combining/synthesizing information across boundaries (Burt, 2005).  The SCM division case 
particularly reveals how boundary spanners (the key user & IT representative) jointly synthesized information to 
develop common narratives in the problem/design space to guide or regulate their actions.  The narratives were built 
on common syntax with intricacies of actual work practices (e.g., exclusive data ownership) and considerations of 
mutual interests (concerns of data quality/user workload).   In contrast, the marketing key user and IT representative 
failed to integrate/interpret the information.  They were overwhelmed by information and could not filter irrelevant 
information and identify important information for actions.  Therefore, either wrong/incomplete problems were 
identified or wrong/incomplete solutions were imposed. 
Our findings suggest bridging knowledge holes in the problem/design space is required for positive project 
outcomes.  First, syntactical holes need to be bridged by common words/language in the problem/design space.  The 
SCM key user and IT both recognized the problem was “obsolete data.”  Because the two were able to exchange 
information successfully, they could grasp the implications of this from the SCM users and develop plans to manage 
contingencies.  Specifically, they realized to make this work would mean opening up data so SCM users could self-
query, and that SCM users would need to be coached to understand how updated master data would benefit them.    
Being able to visualize these consequences, in turn required both the SCM key user and IT appreciated how the 
changes would affect the SCM department.  This in turn meant they had to understand the words the other used, 
translate words when needed to communicate consequences, and use the right words to persuade SCM users to take 
attendant responsibilities (e.g., acquiring skills for managing data).  
In contrast, when the same scenario played in the marketing department, IT did not appreciate how the data-entry 
task would affect marketing users.  Similarly, the marketing key user did not appreciate the changed data structure’s 
implications.  Therefore, simple solutions with damaging consequences (e.g., assigning untrained assistants to 
enter/verify data) were implemented.  The failure of both IT and marketing to appreciate the on-the-ground situation 
and consequences of their actions similarly stemmed from different language and understanding of each other. 
Our findings thus confirm the importance of spanning syntax, interpretation, and consequence holes.  Our findings 
also suggest ways to bridge said holes.  
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Our findings suggest one way of bridging the syntax hole is via using common words/labels to build common 
narratives.  Common narratives connect characters with a sequence of events that have shared meanings (Cunliffe 
and Coupland, 2012).  Within organization studies, narratives are found to be a means of making sense of (Boje, 
1995) or giving sense to (Currie and Brown, 2003) a situation.  In the SCM department, the key user and IT used 
common words (obsolete data, a critical point of control, house building) to construct narratives to describe the 
problem/design space.  They thus could make sense of and give sense to the difficulties users faced (e.g., concerns 
of other users’ commitment) and IT solutions.     
Second, at the interpretation level, more particularistic/local clues need to be integrated to the common narratives 
about the problem/design space.  Through probing contingency factors and processes (discussed/walked through 
users’ data-entry procedures), the SCM key user and IT gained insight into users’ task environment, including direct, 
indirect, distal and near causes (e.g., system interface, task coordination, distractions) of some failure situations 
(e.g., data quality concern, perceived stress).  IT thus could refine IT solutions accordingly (e.g., extensive data 
access for users).   
Finally, consequence holes can be bridged by creating venues for stakeholders to negotiate problem scopes and learn 
new knowledge/skills.  Because the SCM key user and IT routinely shared information, sought opinions from each 
other, and helped each other, a community of practice was formed beyond functional boundaries.  The SCM key 
user also articulated her vision to users, arranged venues for their learning/working together, and consulted their 
opinions about decisions that would affect them.  IT and SCM department thus could see mutual benefits in the 
project, collectively learn skills and knowledge, and value their new competence.    
Our contributions build on a conceptualization of knowledge holes that is empirically studied in a real-life IS 
project.  We demonstrate knowledge holes cannot be bridged before the syntactical, interpretation, and consequence 
holes in the problem/design space are bridged.  Based upon Carlile (2002, 2004), our conceptualization provides a 
more nuanced theorization for analyzing events and actions within and across IS project boundaries.  Our findings 
further suggest a shift of focus to boundary spanners’ active practices and interaction for creating common 
narratives about those events and actions.   
Our findings concur with the foundational role of shared syntax in bridging knowledge holes (Carlile, 2004).  Shared 
syntax can not only be used to transfer information accurately, but help develop common narratives with local 
details and considerations of mutual interests to regulate one’s thought/action.   
Practically, this study explains how boundary spanners in big IS projects (e.g., key users/IT) may act to bridge 
knowledge holes.  Our findings demonstrate boundary spanners bridge knowledge holes via building common 
narratives in the problem/design space.  That is, boundary spanners use common labels/words/language to construct 
common narratives; integrate local clues from users’ work context to said narratives; and create venues for 
negotiating problems and learning new knowledge.    
CONCLUSION 
The proliferation of specialized knowledge communities highlights the importance of boundary spanning.  In this 
study, we propose and empirically study the concept of knowledge holes in a case study of an ERP upgrade.  Our 
findings suggest bridging knowledge holes is a necessary condition for positive project outcomes.  The concept of 
knowledge holes thus complements the concept of structural holes for explaining distinct project outcomes.  
Conditions for bridging the knowledge holes is to bridge syntactical, interpretation and consequence holes 
separating functional groups in large IS projects.   
REFERENCES 
Alter, S. (2014). Theory of workarounds. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 34, 1, 1041-
1066. 
Ancona, D. G. and Caldwell, D. F. (1988). Beyond task and maintenance defining external functions in groups. 
Group & Organization Management, 13, 4, 468-494. 
Bassellier, G.Reich, B. H. and Benbasat, I. (2001). Information technology competence of business managers: A 
definition and research model. Journal of Management Information Systems, 17, 4, 159-182. 
Blum, B. I. (1989). A paradigm for the 1990s validated in the 1980s. Proceedings of the American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics Conference. 
Boje, D. M. (1995). Stories of the storytelling organization: A postmodern analysis of Disney as “Tamara-Land”. 
Academy of Management Journal, 38, 4, 997-1035. 
Liu et al.     Knowledge Holes in IS Project 
  
  12 
Boland, R. J. and Tenkasi, R. V. (1995). Perspective making and perspective taking in communities of knowing. 
Organization Science, 6, 4, 350-372. 
Brown, J. S. and Duguid, P. (1991). Organizational learning and communities-of-practice: Toward a unified view of 
working, learning, and innovation. Organization Science, 2, 1, 40-57. 
Burt, R. S. (1992). The social structure of competition. In N. Nohria & R. G. Eccles (Eds.), Networks and 
Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action (pp. 57-91). Harvard Business School Press,Boston. 
Burt, R. S. (2005). Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
UK. 
Callon, M. (1986). Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of 
St Brieuc Bay. Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge, 32, 196-233. 
Carlile, P. R. (2002). A pragmatic view of knowledge and boundaries: Boundary objects in new product 
development. Organization Science, 13, 4, 442-455. 
Carlile, P. R. (2004). Transferring, translating, and transforming: An integrative framework for managing 
knowledge across boundaries. Organization Science, 15, 5, 555-568. 
Choi, J. N. (2002). External Activities and Team Effectiveness Review and Theoretical Development. Small Group 
Research, 33, 2, 181-208. 
Cross, R. L.Yan, A. and Louis, M. R. (2000). Boundary activities in boundaryless' organizations: A case study of a 
transformation to a team-based structure. Human Relations, 53, 6, 841-868. 
Cunliffe, A. and Coupland, C. (2012). From hero to villain to hero: Making experience sensible through embodied 
narrative sensemaking. Human Relations, 65, 1, 63-88. 
Currie, G. and Brown, A. D. (2003). A narratological approach to understanding processes of organizing in a UK 
hospital. Human Relations, 56, 5, 563-586. 
Druskat, V. U. and Wheeler, J. V. (2003). Managing from the boundary: The effective leadership of self-managing 
work teams. Academy of Management Journal, 46, 4, 435-457. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management Review, 14, 4, 532-
550. 
Fish, S. E. (1980). Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78, 6, 1360-1380. 
Granovetter, M. (1983). The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. Sociological Theory, 1, 1, 201-233. 
Guindon, R. (1990). Designing the design process: Exploiting opportunistic thoughts. Human-Computer Interaction, 
5, 2-3, 305-344. 
Hargadon, A. and Sutton, R. I. (1997). Technology brokering and innovation in a product development firm. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 4, 716-749. 
Iivari, J.Hirschheim, R. and Klein, H. K. (2004). Towards a distinctive body of knowledge for Information Systems 
experts: Coding ISD process knowledge in two IS journals. Information Systems Journal, 14, 4, 313-342. 
Khatri, V. and Vessey, I. (2016). Understanding the Role of IS and Application Domain Knowledge on Conceptual 
Schema Problem Solving: A Verbal Protocol Study. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 
17, 12, 759-803. 
Khatri, V.Vessey, I.Ramesh, V.Clay, P. and Park, S.-J. (2006). Understanding conceptual schemas: Exploring the 
role of application and IS domain knowledge. Information Systems Research, 17, 1, 81-99. 
Khoo, H. M. and Robey, D. (2007). Deciding to upgrade packaged software: A comparative case study of motives, 
contingencies and dependencies. European Journal of Information Systems, 16, 5, 555-567. 
Lapointe, L. and Rivard, S. (2005). A multilevel model of resistance to information technology implementation. MIS 
Quarterly, 29, 3, 461-491. 
Liu, G. H.Chua, C. E. and Wang, E. T. (2016). Managing knowledge holes in large IS projects. Pacific Asia 
Conference on Information Systems, Chiayi, Taiwan. 
Mange, P. and Eisenberg, E. (1987). Emergent communication networks. In F. M. Jablin, L. L. Putnam, K. H. 
Roberts & L. W. Porter (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Communication: An Interdisciplinary 
Perspective (pp. 304-342). Sage Publications,Beverly Hills, CA, . 
Marrone, J. A. (2010). Team boundary spanning: A multilevel review of past research and proposals for the future. 
Journal of Management, 36, 4, 911-940. 
Ng, C. S. P. (2001). A decision framework for enterprise resource planning maintenance and upgrade: A client 
perspective. Journal of Software Maintenance, 13, 6, 431-468. 
Oxman, R. (1997). Design by re-representation: A model of visual reasoning in design. Design Studies, 18, 4, 329-
347. 
Liu et al.     Knowledge Holes in IS Project 
  
  13 
Pawlowski, S. D. and Robey, D. (2004). Bridging user organizations: Knowledge brokering and the work of 
information technology professionals. MIS Quarterly, 28, 4, 645-672. 
Podolny, J. M. and Baron, J. N. (1997). Resources and relationships: Social networks and mobility in the workplace. 
American Sociological Review, 62, 673-693. 
Purao, S.Rossi, M. and Bush, A. (2002). Towards an understanding of the use of problem and design spaces during 
object-oriented system development. Information and Organization, 12, 4, 249-281. 
Roberts, K. H. and O'Reilly, C. A. (1979). Some correlations of communication roles in organizations. Academy of 
Management Journal, 22, 1, 42-57. 
Rodan, S. and Galunic, D. C. (2004). More than network structure: How knowledge heterogeneity influences 
managerial performance and innovativeness. Strategic Management Journal, 25, 6, 541-556. 
Simon, H. A. and Newell, A. (1971). Human problem solving: The state of the theory in 1970. American 
Psychologist, 26, 2, 145-159. 
Spruit, M. and Pietzka, K. (2015). MD3M: The master data management maturity model. Computers in Human 
Behavior, 51, 1068-1076. 
Tushman, M. L. and Scanlan, T. J. (1981). Boundary spanning individuals: Their role in information transfer and 
their antecedents. Academy of Management Journal, 24, 2, 289-305. 
Vilhena, D. A.Foster, J. G.Rosvall, M.West, J. D.Evans, J. and Bergstrom, C. T. (2014). Finding cultural holes: How 
structure and culture diverge in networks of scholarly communication. Sociological Science, 1, 221-238. 
Vitharana, P.Zahedi, M. F. and Jain, H. K. (2016). Enhancing analysts' mental models for improving requirements 
elicitation: A two-stage theoretical framework and empirical results. Journal of the Association for 
Information Systems, 17, 12, 804-840. 
Xiao, Z. and Tsui, A. S. (2007). When brokers may not work: The cultural contingency of social capital in Chinese 
high-tech firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52, 1, 1-31. 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage Publications, London. 
 
 
